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STATEMENT OF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision by the trial court granting Julia Lytle' s Rule 12(b )( 6) 
motion to dismiss Charles Lytle' s Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment. Mr. Lytle' s 
motion sought relief from the portions of a default Decree of Dissolution of Marriage (Default 
Decree) entered in 1992, in which the spousal maintenance awarded far exceeded what Mrs. 
Lytle had prayed for in her counterclaim for divorce. The trial court held that, regardless of 
whether the Default Decree was void as a matter oflaw, Mr. Lytle's motion for relief he had not 
brought the motion within a reasonable time. The central question before this Court is whether a 
void judgment can be challenged under Rule 60(b) at any time. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On December 17, 2012, Charles Lytle filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment. R., p. 
22. The motion alleged that the September 14, 1992, Default Decree failed to confonn with the 
prayer for relief contained in Julie Lytle's counterclaim pertaining to spousal maintenance and 
was therefore void under IRCP §§ 54(c) and 60(b)(4). R., p. 22. 
On January 9, 2013, Mrs. Lytle filed her Motion to Dismiss Motion for Relief from 
Judgment. R., p. 35. Mrs. Lytle's motion contains various brief summary bases in support of the 
motion, but she provided no memorandum oflaw or facts in support of these bases. R., p. 35. 
Instead, she offered her own personal Affidavit in Response to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of 
Motfon for Relief from Judgment. R., p. 37. 
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Mr. Lytle thereafter submitted discovery requests to Mrs. Lytle, answers to which were 
due April 18, 2013. He also scheduled Mrs. deposition for shortly thereafter. When no 
response to discovery was timely served, Mr. Lytle moved to compel answers to his discovery 
requests. Mrs. Lytle then moved for a protective order under IRCP § 26(a), seeking to prevent 
any discovery whatsoever until the Court could hear her Motion to Dismiss. R., p. 44. At the 
hearing held April 15, 2013 1, on the discovery motions, her counsel stated: 
The other issue is the matter of the availability of a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of a 
void Decree. The Supreme Court decisions that in order for a judgment to be void there 
generally must be some jurisdictional defect in the Court's authority, either because the 
Court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
Tr., Vol. I, p. 9, LL. 9-16. 
Counsel further suggested that since this was a purely legal question, allowing discovery to occur 
prior to deciding it was potentially a "waste of time." Tr., Vol. L, p. 10, LL.17-25 and p. 11, LL. 
1-19. 
The trial court's initial response to the discovery motions was to postpone its decision 
until mediation could be had. When mediation failed the parties renewed their discovery 
motions, and the renewed motions were heard by the Court on June 26, 2013.2 Counsel for Mrs. 
Lytle again suggested that the "matter be held in abeyance on the discovery until after a determi-
1 The transcript for this hearing is erroneously labeled "February 15, 2013" on the cover page. 
The actual beginning of the transcript on page 4 makes clear that the hearing was held April 15, 
2013. This transcript is referred to as "Vol. I" in this brief. 
2 The transcript for the hearings held June 26 and June 29, 2013, is referred to as "Vol. II" 
in this brief. 
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nation is made on the Motion to Dismiss." Tr., VoL IL p. 2, LL Counsel for Mr. Lyile 
responded by suggesting that if the Court were to simply treat the matter as a true Rule l 2(b )( 6) 
motion to dismiss, then the Court should deal strictly with the allegations set forth in Mr. Lytle's 
motion for relief from the Default Decree, and not rely on any affidavits or other facts outside of 
that motion. Tr., Vol. II, P. 3, L.4 - p. 5, L. 1. The trial court then acknowledged that the question 
under consideration was whether the Motion for Relief from Judgment depended on whether the 




I mean, if we were just going to deal with the Motion. Then we would just 
be deciding whether as a matter of law you can - it really comes down to 
whether that Decree was void or voidable. 
Right, that's what it seems like to me. 
(Fmiher discussion) 
I don't think it really matters on that issue what ... your client ... Mr. 
Lytle thinks or knows and I don't think his facts matter . . . under your 
motion. 
Tr., Vol. II, p. 6, LL. 6-'-20 ( emphasis added) 
Mrs. Lytle continued to argue that whether the Decree is void under IRCP § 60(b )( 4) 
turns on whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time the Default Decree was 
issued. Tr., Vol. II, p. 8, L 20 p. 9, L. 13. 
On that basis the Court granted the motion for protective order, stopping all discovery 
pending the consideration of Mrs. Lyile's Motion to Dismiss, and further ordering the parties to 
brief the motion by July 19, 2013, and setting a hearing on the motion for July 29, 2013. Tr., Vol. 
II, pp. 24-25. 
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At that hearing the trial court ruled from the bench that 20 years was too long to file a 
motion to wait to set aside a default judgment, regardless of whether the judgment was void for 
lack of jurisdiction. Tr., Vol. II, p. 48, 6-p. 49, L. 17. The trial court issued its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on August 8, 2013, re-emphasizing its basis for granting the motion to 
dismiss, stating that "twenty years is not a reasonable time within which to set aside a Default 
Decree under almost any imaginable set of circumstances." R., pp. 68-69. 
Mr. Lytle appealed to the District Court, and Mrs. Lytle cross-appealed. R., pp. 110-111. 
The district court upheld the trial court's decision in an Opinion and Order on Appeal issued 
March 28, 2014. R. Pp. 108-118.3 This appeal followed by Mr. Lytle's filing of his Notice of 
Appeal 30 days later on April 28, 2014. R., p. 121. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Courts nation¥-ride have held that a void judgment can be attacked under Rule 60(b) at 
any time. Idaho appellate courts have noted that rule, but have not yet directly addressed the 
issue. The Default Decree was void, having included relief far exceeding that requested in the 
counterclaim. Does Idaho follow the majority rule entitling Mr. Lytle to relief from a void 
judgment under Rule 60(b) regardless of the amount of time that passed prior to requesting such 
relief? 
3 The district court's opm1011 also dealt with other matters, including limiting the 
consideration of facts to what was plead and rejecting Mrs. Lytle's cross appeal on a number of 
issues. Tr., pp. 108-118. Since Mrs. Lytle has not appealed the district court's decision on these 




THE STANDARD OF REVIEW OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS IS DE Novo REVIEW 
The standard of review for an appeal of a ruling under IRCP § 12(b )( 6) is succinctly set 
forth in Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,243 P.3d 642 (2010): 
Our standard of review for a grant of dismissal under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b )( 6) was concisely summarized by this Court in Losser v. Bradstreet: "When this 
Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b )(6), we apply the 
same standard of review we apply to a motion for summary judgment. After viewing all 
facts and inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask 
whether a claim for relief has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claims." 145 Idaho 670, 672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). In addition, "[t]his Court reviews an appeal from an order of 
summary judgment de novo, and this Court's standard ofreview is the same as the 
standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Curlee v. 
Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,394,224 P.3d 458,461 (2008). Ergo, a 
district court's dismissal of a complaint under JR.CP. I 2(b)(6) shall be reviewed de 
nova. 
Id. ( emphasis added) 
II. 
THE DEFAULT DECREE Is VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
Both the trial court and the district court accepted as a given that the Default Decree was 
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. R. p. 116-118. Default divorce decrees with 
judgments greater than what was prayed for are void as a matter of law because the Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction. A1eyer v. )\{eyer, 135 Idaho 460, 19 P.3d 774 (Idaho App. 2001), is 
similar to this case in all salient respects. In both cases, the husband's attorney withdrew from the 
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case, ultimately resulting in the entry of a default decree of divorce. 135 ldaho at 461, 19 
P.3d at 775. In this case the spousal maintenance award substantially exceeded what was 
requested in the counterclaim for divorce, and in Meyer, the property division award differed 
substantially from what was requested in the wife's complaint. Id. Finally, in both cases, the 
husband did not file his motion to set aside the decree until after the six-month time period 
prescribed under IRCP § 60(b)(i ), (2), (3) and (6) for voidable judgments had expired. Id. 
The Meyer Court held that because the default decree was "different in kind from" or 
"exceeded" the amount that was prayed for in demand for judgment, it was in violation of IRCP 
§ 54(c) and was therefore void as a matter oflaw under IRCP § 60(b)(4). 
The Meyer court explained: 
A party is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b )( 4) if the underlying judgment is deemed to 
be void. Therefore, the issue before us is whether the portion of the divorce decree 
pertaining to the division of Robe1i and Jo Anne's marital property is void as a matter of 
law. In order for a judgment to be void, there must be some jurisdictional defect in the 
court's authority to enter the judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdic-
tion or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. In the instant case, 
(husband) asserts that the magistrate exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction by failing to 
divide the marital property in accordance with the prayer for relief set out in (wife's) 
complaint. In support of this assertion, (husband) relies on the language contained in 
I.R.C.P. 54(c). Rule 54(c) provides that "a judgment by default shall not be different in 
kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment." Thus, by its 
language Rule 54( c) expressly limits the authority of a court in entering a judgment by 
default. 
* * * 
(Vl)e conclude that the pmiion of the default divorce decree pertaining to the division of 
the marital property exceeded the amount prayed for in contravention of Rule 54( c ). 
Accordingly, we hold that it is void as a matter of law. 
Id., 135 Idaho at 463, 19 P.3d at 777 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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The A1eyer court essentially held that the trial comi did not have subject matter jurisdic-
tion to grant tl1e relief that exceeded or differed kind from tl1e relief prayed for, makjng the 
decree void. 
There can be no question that this is exactly what happened in this case as well. Mr. Lyile 
has alleged the very same basis for setting aside the decree as in Meyers. Thus, pursuant to this 
well- established and applicable authority, the Default Decree is void for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
III. 
A Vorn JUDGMENT CAN BE CHALLENGED AT ANY TIME 
Rule 60(b) of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the basis for setting aside 
judgments, vi1iually minors the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and those of most, if not all, 
other jurisdictions. The rule states that motions seeking relief under this motion shall be made 
"within a reasonable time," and for motions under Rule 60(b )(1 ), (2), and (3) "not more than six 
months" after entry of the judgment or order from which relief is being sought. When a judgment 
is claimed to be void, however, the six-month time limit does not apply since the claim falls 
under Rule 60(b )( 4 ), and the only limitation is that the motion be brought "within a reasonable 
time." 
Regardless of this requirement, the Idaho Supreme Court, quoting California law, recited 
the majority rule that a void judgment can be challenged at any time. "A judgment of a court 
without jurisdiction is void, and void judgments may be attacked at any time." Burns v. Baldwin, 
138 Idaho 480,486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003) (emphasis added) (stating California law). Burns 
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follows the clear majority rule throughout the United States that, regardless of what is stated 
Rule 60(b) regarding filing motions '\.vithin a reasonable " the timing :::.cttiug a:,idc a vu1d 
judgment does not matter, 
Although Idaho has not directly addressed the issue of what constitutes a "reasonable 
time" for bringing a motion for relief from a void judgment, that is only because that issue has 
never been raised on appeal. The Idaho Appellate Court does note in the Meyers decision that 
the motion was brought after the time limits set forth under the rule, but does not address whether 
the timeliness was reasonable because the issue was not raised in the trial court. A.feyer v. Meyer, 
135 Idaho 460,461, 19 P.3d 774, 775. 
However, the overwhelming authority suggests that any time is reasonable for a motion to 
set aside a void judgment. In fact, the Idaho Appellate Court made this very point in an extensive 
footnote on this issue in a decision involving a Ru] e 60(b )( 4) Motion: 
We note that many other jurisdictions have severely relaxed or completely done away 
with the "reasonable time" requirement as to Rule 60(b)(4) motions. See Beller & Keller 
v. Tyler, 120 F.3d 21, 24 (2nd Cir.1997) (explaining that "[c]omis have been exceedingly 
lenient in defining the term "reasonable time," with regard to voidness challenges. In fact, 
it has been oft-stated that, for all intents and purposes, a motion to vacate a default 
judgment as void 'may be made at any time"'); Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc. v. M/V 
Caribbean Wind, 841 F.2d 646,649 (5th Cir.1988) (citing to WRIGHT & A. MILLER 
and holding that "there is generally no timeliness requirement applicable to a Rule 
60(b)(4) motion"); Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities, Inc. v. First National Bank of 
Fairbanks, 685 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Alaska 1984), quoting WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2862 (stating "there is no time limit on an 
attack on a judgment as void"); National Investment Company, Inc. v. Estate of Bronner, 
146 Ariz. 138, 704 P.2d 268,270 (1985) (holding that "the reasonable time requirement 
... does not apply when a judgment is attacked as void'); United Bank of Boulder v. 
Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473, 477-78 (Colo.App.1992) (holding that "a voidjudgment is no 
judgment at all and, therefore, ... the reasonable time requirement of the rule . .. {is] no 
time limitation"); In re ~Marriage of Markowski, 50 Wash. App. 633, 749 P.2d 754 (1988) 
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(holding that a motion to vacate a as be brought at time 
after the entry a/judgment"). Compare Harter v. Products Afanagement Corp., 117 Idaho 
1,, 1 1 "12 70c p ,,,.1 c.o:: 6ouc. (C .. L Anp I Ll, lL , O.J .LU UO.J, 0 . r . 
Fisher Systems Leasing, Inc. v. J & J Gunsmithing & Weaponry Design, Inc., 135 Idaho 624, 
629, 21 P.3d 946, 951, fn 4 (Idaho App. 2001) (emphasis added). 
The decisions cited by the Idaho Appellate Court in Fisher Systems Leasing are not the 
only decisions that have reached that conclusion. The Second Circuit has cited the following 
decisions that reach the same conclusion, even for judgments that are over 20 years old: 
Although Rule 60(b) provides that most motions for relief, including a motion under Rule 
60(b)(4), must be made "within a reasonable time," [6]Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(l), this Court 
has been exceedingly lenient in defining the term "reasonable time," with respect to 
voidness challenges. In fact, it has been oft-stated that, for all intents and purposes, a 
motion to vacate a default judgment as void "may be made at any time." Beller & Keller 
v. Tyler, 120 F.3d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's 
Federal Practice § 60.44(5]( c] ); see Central Vermont Public Service Corp. v. Herbert, 
341 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (motion to challenge lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
filed four years after entry of judgment, was timely); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Ceramica 
Europa 11, Inc., 160 F.3d 849,852 (1st Cir.1998) (recognizing the "any time" rule); seel 1 
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 
2866, at 3 82 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2008) (no time limit); cf. Crosby v. The Bradstreet 
Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir.1963) (30-year-oldjudgment vacated as void on First 
Amendment grounds). 
"R" Best Produce, Inc. v. DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, 124 (2nd Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). The 
Fifth Circuit follows the same rule: 
As a general rule, the fact that such a motion is made long after the entry of a default 
judgment should not be an obstacle to the jurisdictional inquiry. [T]here seems to be 
universal agreement that laches [in bringing a Rule 60(b )( 4) motion] cannot cure a void 
judgment, and no court has denied relief under Rule 60(b)(4) because of delay. 
Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 524 (5th Cir. 2002) ( emphasis added). 
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The District of Columbia has reached the same conclusion: 
as Professor I\1oore his treatise: .Despite the express la11guage Rule [ 60 
(b)], there is no real time limit of any kind on a motion for relieffrom a void judgment. A 
motion under Rule 60 (b)(4) challenging a judgment as void is subject neither to the 
"reasonable" time requirement of Rule 60 (b) nor subject to the equitable doctrine of 
!aches, but rather may be made at any time. MOORE, § 60.44(5] [ c], at 60-152 (footnote 
omitted). 
Hudson v. Shapiro, 917 A.2d 77 (D.C. 2007). 
This authority, as noted and seemingly accepted by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals without need for further comment, demonstrates that the trial court and 
the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Lytle's motion to set aside the void Default Decree (as it 
pertains to spousal maintenance). If the trial court lacked jurisdiction and the decision was void, 
it never had any legal effect, and the passage of 20 years or even more could not transmute this 
void ruling into one that was valid. The passage of time is irrelevant to the void character of the 
judgment. 
Accordingly, Mr. Lytle's motion for relief from the judgment has merit, and the motion to 
dismiss the motion for relief does not. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse both the district comi and the trial court and remand the case, 
instructing that the motion for relief from the void Default Decree should be granted. 
DATED this 16th day of September, 2014. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
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